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Abstract: 
William Whewell raised a series of objections concerning John Stuart Mill’s philosophy 
of science which suggested that Mill’s views were properly informed neither by the 
history of science nor by adequate reflection on scientific practices.  These objections, if 
accurate, would be devastating given Mill’s expressed aim of constructing a philosophy 
of science that was grounded on historical achievements in the sciences and the practices 
driving these developments. The aim of this paper is to revisit and evaluate this incisive 
Whewellian criticism of Mill’s views.  I accomplish this task by assessing Whewell’s 
critique of Mill’s use of the discovery of electrical induction as an illustration of the 
Method of Difference.  The historical evidence demonstrates that Mill’s reconstruction of 
this discovery is inadequate for many of the reasons Whewell cites.  But a study of 
Michael Faraday’s research leading to this discovery also raises some questions about 
Whewell’s own characterization of this historical episode in the science of 
electromagnetism.  Thus, this example provides an opportunity to reconsider the debate 
between Whewell and Mill concerning the role of the sciences in the development of an 
adequate philosophy of scientific methodology. 
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1. Introduction 
 The contentious debates between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill may 
have concealed a common methodological assumption concerning the role of the sciences 
in the construction of an adequate philosophy of science.1  Both Whewell and Mill 
expressed a desire to build a philosophy of the sciences that was informed by the actual 
practices and historical achievements of the sciences.  Whewell, for instance, discussed 
the common, and to his mind specious, use of detached examples from various scientific 
domains in service of a preconceived philosophical framework; he contrasted this 
approach with his own understanding of scientific knowledge and discovery which was 
derived from “a connected and systematic survey of the whole range of Physical Science 
and its History” (Whewell 1847, v. 1, 8).  Whewell’s History of the Inductive Sciences 
(1857 [1837]), originally published three years prior to his Philosophy of the Inductive 
Sciences (1847 [1840]), presented the historical foundations for his philosophical 
conclusions concerning scientific inquiry. 
Mill, for his part, articulated a similar methodological goal in the introduction to 
his analysis of induction in the System of Logic.  He declared, 
What Induction is, therefore, and what conditions render it legitimate, 
cannot but be deemed the main question of the science of logic—the 
question which includes all others.  It is, however, one which professed 
writers on logic have almost entirely passed over.  The generalities of the 
subject have not been altogether neglected by metaphysicians; but, for 
want of sufficient acquaintance with the processes by which science has 
actually succeeded in establishing general truths, their analysis of the 
inductive operation, even when unexceptionable as to correctness, has not 
been specific enough to be made the foundation of practical rules, which 
might be for induction itself what the rules of the syllogism are for the 
interpretation of deduction: while those by whom physical science has 
                                                
1 For some discussion of these issues see, in particular, John Losee (1983) and Laura J. 
Snyder (2002, 2006, and 2008).  
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been carried to its present state of improvement—and who, to arrive at a 
complete theory of the process, needed only to generalize, and adapt to all 
varieties of problems, the methods which they themselves employed in 
their habitual pursuits—never until very lately made any serious attempt to 
philosophize on the subject, nor regarded the mode in which they arrived 
at their conclusions as deserving of study, independently of the 
conclusions themselves.  (John Stuart Mill 1963, v. 7, 284). 
 
Mill was sincere about developing a philosophy of science that was informed by 
scientific practice and historical developments in the sciences.  In fact, he intentionally 
delayed writing Book III (‘Of Induction’) of his System of Logic so that he could foster a 
deeper acquaintance with the history of science—an achievement he explicitly 
acknowledged could not have occurred without reading Whewell’s History.2  Mill also 
revised the manuscript version of the System of Logic so that he could incorporate 
numerous examples from various scientific domains to illustrate his account of scientific 
methodology.3   
                                                
2 Mill (1963, v.7, cxiii) writes, “Whatever may be the value of what the author has 
succeeded in effecting on this branch of [induction], it is a duty to acknowledge that for 
much of it he has been indebted to several important treatises, partly historical and partly 
philosophical, on the generalities and processes of physical science, which have been 
published within the last few years.  To these treatises, and to their authors, he has 
endeavoured to do justice in the body of the work.  But as with one of these writers, Dr. 
Whewell, he has occasion frequently to express differences of opinion, it is more 
particularly incumbent on him in this place to declare, that without the aid derived from 
the facts and ideas contained in that gentleman’s History of the Inductive Sciences, the 
corresponding portion of this work would probably not have been written.”  For further 
discussion of Mill’s use of Whewell’s and Herschel’s works see John M. Robson’s 
textual introduction to John Stuart Mill (1963, v. 7, lxiii). 
3 Mill borrowed many of these examples from his friend Alexander Bain.  Mill (1963, 
v.1, 255) wrote, “The only person from whom I received any direct assistance in the 
preparation of the System of Logic was Mr. Bain, since so justly celebrated for his 
philosophical writings.  He went carefully through the manuscript before it was sent to 
press, and enriched it with a great number of additional examples and illustrations from 
science; many of which, as well as some detached remarks of his own in confirmation of 
my logical views, I inserted nearly in his own words.”   
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Although Whewell did not challenge the sincerity of Mill’s expressed aim to 
construct a philosophy of science that conformed to scientific practice, he raised a series 
of penetrating objections suggesting that Mill’s views were properly informed neither by 
the history of science nor by adequate reflection on scientific practices.4  He maintained 
that Mill’s philosophy failed to account for the historical progression in the various 
scientific domains.  And Mill did not show that his methods were applicable to obvious, 
undoubted examples of scientific discovery extending throughout the history of the 
sciences.  The particular examples Mill invoked to illustrate his views were either too 
recent to admit of adequate development and sufficient understanding, unsubstantiated as 
genuine discoveries, or misinterpreted as instances of inductive discovery when, in fact, 
they were extensions of known laws by deduction.5  Whewell also maintained that Mill’s 
philosophy of scientific methodology was flawed because it failed to provide guidance 
concerning the use of scientific methods to those actually engaged in research.  In 
particular, Mill did not offer directives for reducing the complex relations among 
phenomena to sets of antecedent conditions and consequent phenomena.  A reduction of 
this kind was necessary if these methods were to be useful in establishing laws of 
physical causation—the ultimate goal of inductive inquiry according to Mill. 
                                                
4 See Robert Butts 1963, 288-289. 
5Laura J. Snyder (2002, 2006, and 2008) argues that Whewell’s concern was not simply 
Mill’s failure to infer his methods from historically significant scientific examples but 
that Mill’s methods were not such that they could be inferred from the history of science.  
In her (2008, 153-54) she contends that Whewell “showed us in his works—through 
numerous apt examples—that his philosophy has been embodied in the practice of 
science throughout its history” but “Mill was unable to do so.”  For an extended analysis 
of Snyder’s defense of Whewell’s critique of Mill see [removed for purposes of blind 
review]. 
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The aim of this paper is to revisit and evaluate this incisive Whewellian critique 
of Mill’s use of the sciences in the construction of his philosophy of scientific method.  
But rather than focusing on Whewell’s objections in the abstract, I consider his 
assessment of a particular example Mill employed as an illustration of his views on 
experimental methodology—Michael Faraday’s discovery of electrical induction.6  The 
historical evidence concerning this discovery shows that Mill’s appropriation of 
Faraday’s discovery is inadequate for historical, scientific, and philosophical reasons.  At 
the same time, however, Faraday’s published discussion of his research also raises some 
questions about Whewell’s own historical reconstruction of this same discovery.  Thus, 
Faraday’s research provides an opportunity to revisit the debate between Whewell and 
Mill concerning the role of the sciences in the development of an adequate philosophy of 
scientific method. 
The structure of this paper is as follows.  In Section 2, I provide an account of 
Faraday’s experimental research and the essential background to this debate.  In Section 
3, I discuss Mill’s appropriation of Faraday’s discovery within the context of his System 
of Logic.  In Section 4, I explicate Whewell’s criticisms of Mill’s reconstruction and 
show that Faraday’s published discussion confirms Whewell’s concerns.  In Section 5, I 
raise some concerns about Whewell’s discussion of Faraday’s discovery and his 
underlying assumption that one cannot understand Faraday’s experimental work apart 
from Ampère’s theoretical framework.  In Section 6, I conclude with some brief 
reflections on the implications of this discussion for the debates between Whewell and 
                                                
6 All citations are from Michael Faraday (1956, v. 1, 1-41). 
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Mill about the normative role of the sciences in the construction of an adequate 
philosophy of science. 
2.  Faraday’s Discovery of Electrical Induction 
 In 1831 Faraday discovered that electrical currents, magnets, and electromagnets 
induce corresponding electrical currents in adjacent bodies.7   The importance of this 
discovery for the history of electromagnetism should not be underestimated.  
Electromagnetism emerged as a distinct scientific domain following Hans Christian 
Oërsted’s (1820) discovery that electrical currents generated by a primitive kind of 
battery—the voltaic pile—caused deflections of a magnetic needle in its immediate 
vicinity.8  The voltaic pile consisted of a series of alternating metallic discs (usually zinc 
and copper) separated by a cloth or cardboard soaked in brine.9  The voltaic apparatus 
generated a novel form of electricity that could be conveyed through a conducting wire 
connecting the terminals of the apparatus. 
Following Oërsted’s announcement of this discovery, many scientists including 
Faraday himself expected to discover the reciprocal effect—that magnets could produce 
electrical currents.  But their experiments failed to produce any results recognized as 
evidence of the reality of this effect.10  In his first series of Experimental Researches in 
Electricity (hereafter, “First Series”) Faraday published an account of the experiments 
                                                
7 For more on this discovery and its significance see Bern Dibner (1949), L. Pearce 
Williams (1965), William Berkson (1974), and Geoffrey Cantor (1991). 
8 For some helpful discussions of Oërsted’s discovery see R.C. Stauffer (1953 and 1957), 
L. Pearce Williams (1965), David Gooding (1990), and Roberto De Andrade Martens 
(2003). 
9 Between Oërsted’s discovery and Faraday’s discovery many improvements were made 
to this basic apparatus.  In his experiments, Faraday employed a voltaic trough which 
consisted of two dissimilar metals situated within a trough of fluid. 
10 For a thorough discussion of the experiments conducted during this time and the failure 
to recognize specific results as indicative of electrical induction see Sydney Ross (1965). 
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establishing the induction of electrical currents by means of a voltaic apparatus, ordinary 
magnets, and electromagnets.  After nearly a decade of failed experimental research 
throughout various scientific communities in Europe, Faraday demonstrated conclusively 
that magnets could produce electrical currents.  The central, and unexpected, feature of 
this discovery was the fact that induced electrical currents were momentary rather than 
continuous currents.  Faraday, like his contemporaries, had expected that induced 
electrical currents would be continuous, but his experiments indicated otherwise.11 
Before turning to Mill’s appropriation of Faraday’s discovery, it is important to 
note that Faraday situated the discovery of induced electrical currents within an 
established theoretical framework.  At the time Faraday conducted his research, the 
prevailing theory under which many electrical and magnetic phenomena had been 
subsumed was André-Marie Ampère’s electrodynamic theory.12  Ampère devoted 
considerable attention to electromagnetic phenomena immediately after the 
announcement of Oërsted’s discovery.  Within a few short months, Ampère discovered 
some novel effects that inspired a bold theoretical account of the entire range of known 
electromagnetic phenomena.  One of the most important discoveries was that Oërsted’s 
results could be replicated without utilizing a magnetic needle in one’s experimental 
system.  This indicated that electricity could produce magnetic effects without employing 
magnetic substances and convinced Ampère that all magnetic phenomena could be 
explained in terms of the activity of electrical currents.  In its ultimate form, Ampère’s 
theory posited that magnetic phenomena were the result of electrodynamic currents 
                                                
11 For an interesting discussion of the effect of Faraday’s research on transient 
phenomena in distinct scientific domains on this discovery see Ryan Tweeney (1985). 
12 For more discussion of Ampère’s work see James Hoffman (1987 and 1996). 
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rotating around the molecules of so-called magnetic substances.  Faraday’s discovery that 
voltaic currents, ordinary magnets, and electromagnets produced similar effects 
strengthened the empirical case for Ampère’s reduction of magnetic phenomena to 
electrical causes.  In fact, Faraday (1956, v.1, 16) maintained that his experimental results 
were “strikingly in accordance with and confirmatory of M. Ampère’s theory, and 
[furnish] powerful reasons for believing that the action is the same in both cases.”   
But Faraday’s explicit discussion of the theoretical implications of his results 
focused upon two specific concerns: (i) the possible causes for the transient nature of 
induced electrical currents and (ii) the laws governing both induced electrical currents 
and related electromagnetic phenomena.  With respect to the former, Faraday proposed 
that the momentary nature of induced electrical currents could be explained by the 
hypothesis that the wire under induction assumes a “peculiar state”—the electro-tonic 
state—that resists the production of a continuous electrical current.  Faraday described 
the electro-tonic state as a momentary state acquired by the wire under induction whose 
existence was dependent upon the activity of inducing currents or magnetic substances.  
Although Faraday confessed that there was no independent evidence grounding the 
reality of this proposed state, he noted that adopting it as a hypothesis could provide an 
account of a mechanism by which an identical cause could produce this diverse array of 
effects.  Faraday’s reflection could be interpreted as an attempt to extend Ampère’s 
theoretical framework by supplying a hypothesis concerning the manner in which 
electricity might act as the underlying cause of induced electrical currents in each 
experimental trial.  
 9 
But Faraday followed this speculative discussion of the electro-tonic state with an 
extensive discussion of the laws governing both induced electricity and related 
electromagnetic phenomena.13  At the time, many of Faraday’s contemporaries thought 
that these phenomena were completely mysterious.  The phenomena in question involved 
the magnetic effects of substances scientists generally thought were essentially non-
magnetic.  In particular, Dominique François Arago had discovered that a rotating copper 
disc caused a magnet delicately suspended above it to rotate in a corresponding direction.  
But copper in its natural resting state exhibited no magnetic qualities.  Charles Babbage 
and John F.W. Herschel discovered the reciprocal effect that rotating magnets caused 
metallic discs in their immediate vicinity to rotate in a corresponding direction.14  But 
when these magnets and metallic discs were at rest, they exhibited no detectable magnetic 
effects.   
Faraday argued that the key to explaining these effects was the transient nature of 
induced electricity.  He showed that the motion of any metal around the pole of a magnet 
gives rise to electrical currents that move in a transverse direction across the metal.  
Faraday (1956, v.1, 34) writes, “All these results show that the power of inducing electric 
currents is circumferentially exerted by a magnetic resultant or axis of power, just as 
circumferential magnetism is dependent upon and is exhibited by an electric current.”  
Thus, in Arago’s original experiments, the constant rotation of the magnets in a 
corresponding direction to the rotating discs is explicable in terms of the currents 
generated by the motion of the rotating discs around the pole of the magnets in the 
experimental system.  Faraday’s experimental research established the exact nature of 
                                                
13 For an extensive discussion of this aspect of Faraday’s research see Steinle (1994). 
14 See Charles Babbage and John F.W. Herschel (1825). 
 10 
induced electrical currents and generated a correct understanding of the laws governing 
both the phenomena of induced electricity and the magnetic effects of rotating discs.   
3.  Mill on the Discovery of Electrical Induction 
 Mill situated Faraday’s discovery of electrical induction within an extended 
discussion of the “theory of induced electricity” (1963, v.7, 410ff).  In particular, 
Faraday’s experimental research generated evidence that, when combined with other 
experimental results, enabled one “to find under what conditions any electrified body, 
whether positively or negatively electrified, gives rise to a contrary electric state in some 
other body adjacent to it” (John Stuart Mill 1963, v.7, 410).  Mill claimed that Faraday’s 
results illustrated his understanding of the Method of Difference. But it is important to 
note that Mill was not seeking to give a detailed reconstruction of Faraday’s discovery or 
Faraday’s purposes in conducting his experimental research.  Rather, Mill utilized 
Faraday’s work because it illustrated his understanding of a scientific method and, 
thereby, served as an example of the significance of this method for the justification of a 
proposed explanatory law.15 
 Mill contends that the purpose of Faraday’s research was to determine whether a 
conducting wire carrying a voltaic current would produce an opposite electrical current 
on another conductor in its vicinity.  But Mill maintains that Faraday’s research was 
founded on the assumption that common, or static, electricity is identical with the 
electricity occasioned by a voltaic apparatus.  He writes, 
                                                
15 Struan Jacobs (1991) and Steffen Ducheyne (2008) have argued that in later editions of 
Mill’s System of Logic, Mill abandons the notion that his methods are methods of 
discovery.  Instead, they are methods of the justification of proposed laws governing 
phenomena. 
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Since common or machine electricity, and voltaic electricity, may be 
considered for the present purpose to be identical, Faraday wished to know 
whether, as the prime conductor develops opposite electricity upon a 
conductor in its vicinity, so a voltaic current running along a wire would 
induce an opposite current upon another wire laid parallel to it at a short 
distance.  (John Stuart Mill 1963, v.7, 413) 
 
The results of Faraday’s experiments were different from the other cases Mill 
discussed in connection with the law of induced electricity in that all the other cases 
involved an electric body inducing an opposite and continuous electrical state in 
neighboring bodies.  Faraday’s results in this experiment, according to Mill, showed that 
the opposite electrical state was produced within the primary conducting wire itself.  Mill 
observed,  
From the nature of a voltaic charge, the two opposite currents necessary to 
the existence of each other are both accommodated in one wire; and there 
is no need of another wire placed beside it to contain one of them.... (John 
Stuart Mill 1963, v.7, 413) 
 
Thus, in the case of Faraday’s experiments, Mill believed that the “exciting cause can and 
does produce all the effect which its laws require, independently of any electric 
excitement of a neighbouring body” (1963, v.7, 413).  Mill took the transient effects 
Faraday had produced to be phenomena of a different kind than ordinary induced 
electricity.  If the term ‘induced electricity’ refers only to those cases in which the 
electricity in one body brings about an opposite and continuous electrical state in a 
neighboring body, then Faraday’s discovery of a momentary effect should not be 
understood as a case of ‘induced electricity’.   
Reconstructing Mill’s discussion shows that one can construe Faraday’s research 
in accordance with the method of difference.  The method of difference involves 
comparing instances in which a phenomenon occurs with those instances in which it fails 
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to occur in order to discover the particular antecedent condition absent in those cases in 
which the phenomenon in question fails to occur.  In this case, the contrasting classes are 
those cases in which the phenomenon of induced electricity in a neighboring body is 
present and those in which it is fails to occur.  Recall  that ‘induced electricity’ is a 
technical term for Mill, referring to the class of phenomena in which one electrified body 
gives rise to an opposite and continuous electrical state in a neighboring body.  Faraday’s 
discovery of the transient effect produced by a voltaic current does not fall within this 
class because the current-carrying wire does not induce a continuous electrical current in 
a neighboring body.  The circumstantial difference between this instance and those in 
which induced electricity occurs is that the current-carrying wire in the latter produces 
the opposite states within itself rather than in a neighboring body.  Thus, Faraday’s 
discovery supports Mill’s understanding of the law of induced electricity which holds that 
the production of one kind of electricity depends upon the correlative production of the 
opposite electricity in a body in the immediate vicinity of the original current. 
4. Whewell’s Critique of Mill 
Whewell summarily dismisses Mill’s discussion of the theory of induced 
electricity as demonstrating a general ignorance concerning some of the simplest 
doctrines within the domains of electricity and magnetism.  And he argues that Mill’s 
reconstruction of Faraday’s discovery is a gross mischaracterization of Faraday’s explicit 
views concerning induced electrical effects.16  After all, Whewell argues, Faraday did not 
assume the identity of common electricity and voltaic electricity.  Furthermore, to say 
that this assumption was part of the rationale for Faraday’s research mischaracterizes the 
                                                
16 See Robert Butts 1963, 288-289. 
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explicit research agenda Faraday announces at the start of his research.  The goal was to 
discover whether magnets could produce electrical effects since electrical currents could 
produce magnetic effects.  This in no way depended upon assuming the identity of static 
and voltaic electricity.  And Mill’s failure to mention Faraday’s actual reasons for 
conducting this research suggests a failure on Mill’s part to appreciate the historical 
significance of Faraday’s discovery within the domain of electromagnetism. Whewell 
also notes that, contrary to Mill’s interpretation, Faraday was agnostic about the reality of 
opposing electrical currents existing in the conducting wire.  Although this was an 
essential commitment of Ampère’s electrodynamic theory, Faraday refused to assent to 
this hypothesis throughout his career.17 
Whewell does not reveal the historical and philosophical underpinnings of this 
critique in his explicit discussion of Mill’s work, but attention to his reconstruction of 
Faraday’s discovery in his (1847) Philosophy will provide a deeper understanding of his 
dissatisfaction with Mill’s views.  For Whewell, Faraday’s research is but one stage of 
the progression in the mechanico-chemical sciences towards a more clear and defined 
notion of polarity.  The initial, and vague, use of this idea occurred originally in the 
context of magnetic phenomena but was later expanded to account for the effects of static 
electricity.  But there were important differences between magnets and electrical 
conductors; electrical phenomena exhibited the general nature of polarity without 
localized physical poles.   
                                                
17 Although Faraday recognized that Ampère’s electrodynamic theory was well-grounded 
and fruitful, he had great reservations about accepting any theoretical account of the 
causes of electromagnetic phenomena at the early stages of research within this domain.  
In fact, he engaged in correspondence with Ampère in the early years of the 1820s about 
his on-going concerns with Ampère’s views.  For more on this F.A.J.L James (1991, 252, 
287-288) and L. Pearce Williams (1985). 
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So, theorists had to find another way to account for these distinct kinds of polarity 
without referring them to localized and permanent points in a substance.  In this context, 
Whewell claims that theorists accounted for electrical polarity by proposing that there 
were two kinds of electrical fluid distributed through various physical bodies.18  While 
theorists managed to account for all of the known laws of electricity by employing this 
hypothesis, the voltaic apparatus produced new kinds of polar relations distinct from 
those exhibited by static electricity.  These new phenomena were not explicable in terms 
of a two-fluid theory of electricity and, as such, scientists had to develop a novel 
understanding of the idea of polarity which was not dependent upon any of the available 
hypotheses concerning mechanisms or processes responsible for producing phenomena 
exhibiting polarity.  Whewell writes,  
Thus, we too may remark, all the superfluous and precarious parts gradually drop 
off from the hypothesis which we devise in order to represent polar phenomena; 
and the abstract notion of polarity—of equal and opposite powers called into 
existence by a common condition—remains unincumbered with extraneous 
machinery. (William Whewell 1847, v. 1, 349) 
 
 The primary importance of electromagnetism in this context was that it provided 
evidence of a connection between distinct kinds of polarities.  Oërsted’s vague notion of 
a connection between the polarities exhibited by electricity and magnetism was refined 
by experiment until they came to be seen as manifestations of one and the same cause—
the polarity of Ampère’s electrodynamic current.  Thus, 
the vague and obscure persuasion that there must be some connexion 
between electricity and magnetism, so long an idle and barren conjecture, 
was unfolded into a complete theory, according to which magnetic and 
electromotive actions are only two different manifestations of the same 
forces; and all the above-mentioned complex relations of polarities are 
                                                
18 Whewell 1847, v. 1, 347. 
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reduced to one single polarity, that of the electro-dynamic current. 
(William Whewell 1847, v.1, 361) 
 
In Whewell’s mind, the principle of the connection between distinct kinds of 
polar phenomena was a regulative factor guiding and directing research within the 
domain of electromagnetism; it was not the mere summation of experimental 
observations but an extra-experiential conception framing research and giving form to 
experimental results.  Ampère’s theoretical framework provided the necessary refinement 
of this idea by reducing distinct kinds of polarity to the polarity of the electrodynamic 
current.  Accordingly, Whewell maintains that Ampère’s conceptual framework became 
an instrument of reasoning for Faraday in his experimental work.  He suggests that 
Ampère’s views provided the essential framework from which Faraday conceived and 
conducted his experimental work.  Thus, one cannot understand the nature of Faraday’s 
discovery of electrical induction without attending to Ampère’s electrodynamic theory. 
Against Mill, Whewell maintains that one cannot clearly discern the nature of 
Faraday’s experimental research on induced electrical effects without attending to the 
generating theoretical context.  Ampère’s well-established electrodynamic theory served 
as a significant motivating influence directing Faraday’s research and an essential 
element of his discoveries.  As such, Mill’s account mischaracterizes Faraday’s motives, 
his findings, and their historic and scientific significance.  Mill’s use of this example fails 
because there is no relationship between the historical and experimental reality of 
Faraday’s research and Mill’s own philosophical reconstruction. 
5. Reassessing Whewell’s Critique 
But Faraday’s discussion also raises some interesting questions about Whewell’s 
characterization of the theoretical underpinnings of Faraday’s research.  In particular, the 
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“First Series” does not establish the exact extent to which Faraday’s research was 
dependent upon Ampère’s electrodynamic theory.  Was Ampère’s theoretical framework 
merely the theoretical framework that initially motivated Faraday’s experiments, or was it 
a guiding conceptual framework from which Faraday drew suggestions for experimental 
research or changes in experimental parameters, or, more substantively, was it essential 
to Faraday’s understanding and description of the nature and causes of induced electrical 
currents?  While Mill clearly failed to note the Ampèrian context of Faraday’s research, 
Whewell may have overemphasized the extent to which Faraday’s research depends upon 
Ampère’s views.  As such, Whewell may have overlooked the ways in which Mill could 
have employed Faraday’s work to illustrate his understanding of scientific methods and 
his general understanding of the philosophy of science.   
While the significance of Ampère’s electrodynamic theory should not be 
understated, Faraday’s introductory remarks in his “First Series” suggests that 
confirmation of Ampère’s views may not have been paramount in his mind.  At the outset 
of his paper, Faraday states explicitly that it was a “curious fact” that no one had shown 
that magnets could induce electrical currents.  The fact that no one had discovered these 
effects was curious, Faraday writes, “Whether Ampère’s beautiful theory were adopted, 
or any other, or whatever reservation were mentally made” (Faraday 1956, v.1, 2).  The 
important point to note here is that the failure to discover the reciprocal effect was 
curious because of the implications of Oërsted’s discovery alone.  While Ampère’s views 
were an important part of the context of Faraday’s discovery and Faraday’s results 
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corroborated Ampère’s theory, the significance of Faraday’s results could be understood 
independent of Ampère’s theoretical framework. 19 
And Faraday’s discussion of the theoretical implications of his discovery shows 
that Faraday was concerned primarily with accounting for the conditions necessary for 
the reliable production and understanding of the basic effect and providing a unifying 
explanation of the laws governing induced electricity and other related phenomena—
primarily Arago’s phenomena.  His speculation about the underlying electro-tonic state of 
matter, although important for understanding his initial conjectures about the causes of 
the phenomena in question, was not as important to the account he offers in the “First 
Series”.  And Faraday abandoned this hypothesis of the electro-tonic state by the time he 
published his Second Series of Experiments in Electricity just two months after the “First 
Series”.  In a footnote added to the section recording his speculations concerning the 
electro-tonic state, Faraday (1956, v.1, 16) writes, “…later investigations…of the laws 
governing [induced electrical currents], induce me to think that [these phenomena] can be 
fully explained without admitting the electro-tonic state.  My views on this point will 
appear in the second section of these researches.”  Faraday’s attempt to understand the 
laws governing induced electrical currents led him to abandon his earlier conjectures 
                                                
19Although I did not discuss Faraday’s account of the direction of the induced electrical 
current in his research, this was an important part of his research.  In fact, Faraday’s 
initial account of his discovery of electrical induction included in a letter to his friend 
Richard Phillips contained a significant error concerning the direction of the induced 
electrical current.  Josè Romo and Manuel G. Doncel (1994) argue that Faraday’s error 
stems from his reliance upon expectations derived from Ampère’s electrodynamic theory.  
It was only through subsequent experimental research that Faraday was able to correct his 
erroneous account of the direction of the induced electrical current.  This provides 
another piece of evidence that Faraday’s experimental research is separable from 
Ampère’s views since it was only be conducting his research that Faraday was able to 
correct the misleading Ampèrian understanding of the effect. 
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about this hypothetical state.  Thus, the explanatory claims he made concerning the laws 
governing induced electrical currents enjoyed a much higher degree of epistemic 
credibility in Faraday’s mind. 
Finally, when one attends to the experiments Faraday performed, especially in his 
research on Arago’s rotating discs, one sees that Faraday’s primarily goal is to explore 
the relationship between the systematic adjustment of experimental parameters and the 
resulting effects within his experimental system.  By the time Faraday was working on 
these questions, he had developed a stable understanding of the basic or simple case, of 
induced electricity; he knew how to produce it reliably and which sets of antecedent 
conditions were essential to the production of this effect.20  His subsequent 
experimentation explored the relationship between this basic effect and other related 
phenomena with an eye to understanding the laws governing these phenomena.  Even if 
Ampère’s views were essential to the motivations of Faraday’s research program, by the 
time Faraday had achieved an experimental understanding of an induced electrical 
current as a basic effect, his goal was not to deepen the support for Ampère’s theoretical 
views.  His results could be used to corroborate Ampère’s views, but Faraday was much 
more concerned about articulating a precise account of the basic effect, the conditions for 
its reliable production, and a general account of the laws unifying this phenomenon with 
other related phenomena.   
Faraday was also interested in technological advancements he could produce as a 
result of his understanding of these effects and their governing laws.  His research had 
indicated that one could produce a continuous flow of electrical currents through the 
                                                
20 For much more on this aspect of Faraday’s work see Steinle (1994, 1997, and 2002). 
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continuous motion of magnets.  This was an important discovery because up until this 
point, the production of dynamic forms of electricity was inhibited by an apparatus whose 
power diminished over time.  The prospect of producing a continuous flow of electrical 
currents with an apparatus that would not lose its power was an exciting possibility. 
Hence, although Whewell is correct to note the importance of Ampère’s work in 
providing a faithful historical reconstruction of Faraday’s work, it is not clear that 
Faraday’s experimental research itself, his understanding of the results, and his 
articulation of the theoretical implications of these results were fundamentally dependent 
upon Ampère’s views.  The experiments themselves, the decisions necessary to make 
systematic adjustments to experimental parameters, the recording of significant results, 
and the attempts to explain related phenomena—all of these aspects of Faraday’s work, it 
appears, are separable from the Ampèrian context even if they are relevant to case one 
can make for Ampère’s electrodynamic theory.  As such, it is not clear that a philosophy 
of science must take into account the Ampèrian theoretical framework in order to give an 
adequate account of the nature and significance of experimental practices in the context 
of this discovery.  However flawed Mill’s actual discussion was it is not clear that Mill’s 
failure to appreciate Ampère’s electrodynamic theory automatically undercuts the 
philosophical adequacy of his views concerning scientific methodology. 
But are there aspects of Faraday’s research that Mill could employ in support of 
his philosophy of scientific methodology?  Answering this question requires a more 
nuanced account of Mill’s mature philosophical views and, thus, it is instructive to 
consider Mill’s response to Whewell’s general criticisms recounted above in Section 1.  
Mill contends that his sole aim in providing an inductive logic was 
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to provide rules and models…to which if inductive arguments conform, 
those arguments are conclusive, and not otherwise.  This is what the Four 
Methods profess to be, and what I believe they are universally considered 
to be by experimental philosophers, who had practised all of them long 
before any one sought to reduce the practice to theory.  (John Stuart Mill, 
1963, v. 7, 430). 
 
His methods, then, should not be taken as methods of discovery; rather, they are formal 
methods by which one can test whether a discovery satisfies the canons of inductive 
inquiry.  Progress cannot be made in the sciences until one possesses a canon for 
assessing whether some body of evidence inductively justifies a general explanatory 
claim.  
Furthermore, Mill maintains that Whewell failed to appreciate the idealized 
context presupposed by his discussion of experimental methods.  This context requires 
that one abstract from the necessarily complicated fabric of causal relations in nature in 
order to isolate specific causes and their effects.  Within this context, Mill’s methods 
should be understood as initial steps in the attempt to satisfy the ultimate aim of 
inquiry—the unification of lower-level laws under general laws of nature.  But in both 
the idealized context presupposed in his discussion of experimental methods and the 
actual contexts of inquiry where one must employ deduction and hypothesis in addition 
to inductive methods, the primary function of experimental methods is to provide a canon 
for assessing the conclusiveness of one’s evidence.  So, Mill’s view is that the 
experimental methods he outlines in the System of Logic provide a canon for assessing 
whether some data (i.e., experimental effects) inductively support a general explanatory 
claim made on the basis of this data.   
Given this qualified understanding of Mill’s account of scientific methodology, I 
maintain that there are elements of Faraday’s research that Mill could have employed to 
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illustrate his understanding of scientific methodology.  First, it is clear that the central 
goal of Faraday’s work, following his discovery of induced electrical currents and his 
experimental understanding of the conditions essential to its production, was to provide 
substantive evidence for his explanatory claims concerning the laws governing these 
effects.  This accords within Mill’s understanding of the ultimate goal of the sciences.  
Second, the results generated by Faraday’s numerous experimental trials and the 
systematic adjustment of experimental parameters served to justify his more general 
claims concerning the governing laws of these phenomena.  Again this agrees with Mill’s 
view that the primary function of experimental methods is to justify general explanatory 
claims concerning the laws governing phenomena.  Third, Mill’s commentary on the 
complexity of actual scientific inquiry and the role of scientific methods in insuring that 
one has isolated particular threads of causation accords with Faraday’s own practice in 
this context.  Faraday demonstrates an acute awareness of the complex causal nexus of 
his various experimental systems.  For this reason, he took steps to make sure that his 
experimental results were neither spurious nor misleading by replicating trials, adjusting 
parameters, and constructing new apparatus to reproduce the results in independent 
contexts.  These tests helped him to secure his results from subsequent defeat by insuring 
that they were not mere artifacts of his experimental system. Thus, at minimum Mill’s 
views are consistent with many elements of Faraday’s experimental practice. 
Given that Mill’s purpose in employing actual scientific examples was primarily 
illustrative, it is instructive to consider whether Mill could have employed any of 
Faraday’s actual experiments reported in the “First Series” to illustrate his views.  I 
conclude this section by considering one example that would effectively illustrate Mill’s 
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method of difference.  One of Faraday’s experiments demonstrating that magnets could 
produce induced electrical currents involved the following experimental system.  Using a 
hollow cylinder of pasteboard, Faraday constructed compound helices from eight lengths 
of copper wire.  Four of these wires were connected together forming one compound 
helix (Helix A) and the other four wires formed a distinct compound helix (Helix B).  
Faraday connected the ends of these elementary helices to a magnetic needle whose 
deflections would serve to indicate the presence of electrical currents.  Using a permanent 
cylindrical magnet, Faraday inserted one end of this magnet into the axis of the helix and 
when the galvanometer needle was stationary he thrust it into the cylinder.  He left the 
magnet in until the galvanometer came to its original position and then withdrew it and 
the needle exhibited a deflection in the opposite direction.  
Given that the indicating device was a magnetic needle, Faraday had to insure that 
the magnets used in these experiments would not cause the deflection directly.  He had to 
prove that the deflections were the result of induced electrical currents not the direct 
magnetic action of the magnet he employed in his experiments.   Faraday observed,  
All care was taken to guard against any direct action of the inducing magnet upon 
the galvanometer, and it was found that by moving the magnet in the same 
direction, and to the same degree on the outside of the helix no effect on the 
needle was produced.  (Faraday 1956, v. 1, 12) 
 
 Since these magnets did not cause the deflection directly from their motion outside the 
axis of the helix, the inductive effects could not be attributed to the direct action of the 
magnets.  Thus, Faraday concluded that the deflections were produced by induced 
electrical currents. 
One can reconstruct Faraday’s support for this claim in accordance with Mill’s 
method of difference.  In the first trial, the initiation of motion of a permanent magnet 
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within the axis of the helices resulted in the deflection of the indicator needle.  In the 
second trial, the initiation of motion of a permanent magnet outside of the axis of the 
helices did not produce deflections of the galvanometer needle.  Since the deflections 
occurred in the first trial and did not occur in the second trial, one must trace this 
difference to one of the antecedent conditions.  This difference was in the location of the 
magnet when Faraday initiated motion with the magnet.  Given that there was no direct 
action of the magnet on the galvanometer needle, these experiments supported the 
general claim that the deflections in the first case were the result of induced electrical 
currents produced by the motion of the magnet within the axis of the compound helices.  
Note that this reconstruction of Faraday’s research is consonant with Mill’s 
understanding of method of difference and his general idea of the role of experimental 
methods in the justification of general claims. 
6. Conclusion  
Whewell was right to challenge the scientific grounding of Mill’s philosophy of 
science.  Mill’s failure to engage with the complexities of the history of science and his 
indirect acquaintance with scientific practices led him to mischaracterize specific 
episodes in the history of science.  Close attention to Faraday’s discovery corroborates 
Whewell’s critique and warrants a rejection of Mill’s reconstruction of Faraday’s 
research.  But a study of Faraday’s research also cautions against an expeditious 
acceptance of Whewell’s understanding of the dependence of this discovery upon 
Ampère’s theoretical framework.  While Whewell is correct to note the Ampèrian 
theoretical context that informed Faraday’s research, it is not clear that Ampère’s views 
were essential to the entire range of Faraday’s experimental practices, his formulation 
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and articulation of the laws governing the phenomena in question, and the explanatory 
implications he took to be central to his discovery.  And the fact that these are separable 
from Ampère’s conceptualization of electromagnetic phenomena allows for a 
reconsideration of the merits of Mill’s philosophy of science distinct from his actual 
inaccurate discussion of Faraday’s discover. 
In the previous section, I showed how Mill could have employed some of 
Faraday’s work to illustrate the nature and commitments of his philosophy of science.  
The upshot of this discussion is the following.  Whewell can legitimately claim that there 
is little inductive support for Mill’s philosophy of science.  He cannot claim, however, 
that Mill’s philosophy of science is not inferable from the history and practice of science.  
There are several aspects of Faraday’s experimental work that accord with Mill’s 
understanding of the structures, aims, and methods of the sciences.  As such, Mill’s views 
are consistent with scientific practices in this particular historical episode.  Hence, it is 
possible to present evidence from the history and practice of science that grounds Mill’s 
philosophical conclusions concerning scientific practice. 
Whewell may respond that the agreement between a philosophy of science and 
several instances of experimental practice within one domain of the sciences does not 
establish the adequacy of this philosophical framework.  One must accumulate a great 
deal more evidence from the history of science and throughout various domains in the 
sciences in order to establish one’s philosophical conclusions.  While this rejoinder is 
fair, it does not demonstrate that Mill’s philosophy of science is not inferable from the 
sciences.  In order to show this, it seems, Whewell must show that it is impossible for 
Mill to derive support from the history and practice of the sciences for his views.  Mill’s 
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philosophy of science, properly understood, can derive support from specific episodes in 
the history of science and scientific practice.   
But there are several other factors that proponents of this Whewellian critique 
may invoke in defense of their claim that Mill’s views lack substantive foundations in the 
history and practice of the sciences.  They could respond that Mill’s philosophy of 
science understood thus at best characterizes just a preliminary stage of scientific inquiry.  
And, in this respect, it is not clear that Mill’s philosophy is uniquely supported by the 
evidence from Faraday’s research because Whewell himself thinks that discovery of laws 
is the penultimate goal of scientific inquiry.  Even though Whewell and Mill disagree 
about the ultimate goal of scientific inquiry, they agree that a paramount goal of the 
sciences is the discovery and justification of explanatory laws.  As such, the fact that 
Faraday’s primary goal in this research was to discovery and ground a precise articulation 
of the laws of induced electricity does not establish that Faraday thinks of this as the 
ultimate goal of inquiry.  And Faraday’s speculative proposals concerning the electro-
tonic state suggest that, pace Mill, Faraday does not think of the justification of laws as 
the ultimate goal of scientific inquiry.   
What this response suggests is that whether Mill’s or Whewell’s philosophy of 
science is inferable from the history and practice of the sciences depends upon whether 
their respective philosophical views adequately characterize the processes and methods of 
the sciences leading to the discovery and justification of scientific knowledge claims.  
Answering this question depends in part on the function and epistemic status of 
theoretical conceptions in scientific inquiry.  For Whewell, these conceptions are in part 
constitutive of scientific knowledge, but as we have seen it is not clear that the historical 
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record in the Faraday case confirms this account.  While his basic philosophical stance 
may accord with numerous examples throughout the history of science, my study of 
Faraday’s discovery raises questions about the theory-dependence of Faraday’s 
experimental research.  It simply is unclear how the entirety of Faraday’s guided by 
Ampère’s theoretical views.  It certainly is plausible to think that Ampère’s conceptual 
framework was an important generating source for Faraday’s research, but the detailed 
experimental work Faraday performed and his careful reasoning from his experimental 
results suggest that much of this work could be understood apart from the generating 
theoretical context. 
The general conclusion one ought to infer from this discussion is that much more 
work needs to be done in order to articulate the normative role of the history and 
practices of the sciences in the construction of an adequate philosophy of science.  While 
there are clear cases where a philosophy fails to accord with the history and the practice 
of the sciences, until there is a precise and well-grounded account of the function of the 
history and practice of the sciences in the development of a philosophy of science, it is 
not clear how one can determine whether, and to what extent, a particular philosophy of 
science is adequately-informed by the sciences. 
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